Abstract: There are a significant number of national competition law systems which prohibit anti-competitive behaviour. The cross-border nature of many antitrust/competition law infringements leaves no doubt that parallel and related competition law proceedings will arise. Competition laws enjoy public policy character, and as a result are regarded as mandatory provisions of the forum. The extra-territorial application of mandatory antitrust law provisions does suggest that different sets of competition laws may be applicable depending on where the competition law proceedings are taking place. Since there may often be a conflict of competition laws, there are complex issues which must be addressed in a global context. This article demonstrates that a private international law tool, which aims to preserve the diverse national competition law cultures, may be used as a new mode of governance in a global context. Such an instrument could/should take account of the competition laws of the countries that have legitimate interests to regulate the relevant business activities. Given the high costs for achieving harmonised competition laws in a global context, agreeing upon a private international law instrument with a view to coordinating cross-border competition law proceedings may be a more realistic objective to be pursued by the international community.
law infringements have cross-border implications. 10 It has been very recently submitted that "transnational networks occupy centre stage in competition law, which is attentive to (and suspicious of) informal alliances or spontaneous congruence of market behaviour." 11 There is a strong case that the policy-makers should carefully consider what mode of "governance"
12
should be used with a view to setting up an effective global competition law enforcement regime. The literature on regulation suggests that a global system, which is not characterised by the availability of a supranational regulatory authority, may need to rely on other modes of governance. 13 One such mode of governance is "hierarchy, in which states transfer regulatory 
which allocates jurisdiction and identifies applicable laws in disputes involving
It has been submitted that "The term 'governance' is used in relation to national, European and international orders, and it crosses the public-private divide. private undertakings that engage in anti-competitive practices in a global context. Indeed, many private undertakings whose business activities are regulated by competition laws are multinational groups of companies doing business in several jurisdictions. 18 A contemporary world, in which multi-national companies employ business strategies that are global in nature, 19 calls for an appropriately drafted private international law instrument preserving the diverse national competition law cultures. Employing a private international tool as a new mode of governance could/should be used to co-ordinate cross-border antitrust law enforcement activities. 20 Coordinating enforcement activities and avoiding duplication of work would be important for the creation of a "global legal system" 21 which provides for effective remedies in cross-border competition law cases. With this in mind, an analysis of the jurisdictional issues and substantive law issues, in the light of the relevant case law, will be used to indicate how cross-border competition law enforcement activities could be co-ordinated in a global context.
To this end, the article will open with a brief explanation as to why an effective private international law regime would be necessary as a part of a well-functioning global competition law framework. Then, the importance of jurisdictional issues arising in the context of crossborder competition law infringements will be outlined by engaging with relevant cases. Thirdly, complex issues of jurisdiction arising in cases where there is a conflict of competition laws, as well as a level of divergence, will be duly analysed. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn with a view to co-ordinating cross-border competition law enforcement activities in a global context.
B. DEVISING A GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW REGIME: A CASE FOR A PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW INSTRUMENT
A level of harmonisation of substantive competition laws and principles has proved difficult in a global context. This appears to be the case despite the need for a global competition law regime being identified by influential bodies such as the European Commission, 22 which noted:
18 e.g. Vitamins, supra n 10; Gas Insulated Switchgear, supra n 10; LCD -Liquid Crystal Displays, supra n 10. "The ICN, now more than ten years old, is normally regarded as a success in moving law and process towards convergence. Its success is in large part attributed to the fact that it is comprised of the competition law community, not the trade community, and that, since it has no formal powers, little seems to be at stake in agreeing to (for example) recommended practices or 49 Crane, supra n 9, 237. 50 Tarullo, supra n 30, 455. principles. Moreover, because the agencies' agreements in ICN do not bind their governments, no higher governmental organization is needed, thus facilitating agreement." 58 That said, there is a view that "[t]his form of soft cooperation furthers the enforcement goals of regulators but does virtually nothing to address the over-and underregulation of antitrust law at international level."
59 Indeed, national competition authorities, which would exclusively apply their national (or regional) competition laws, may be less than adequate competition law enforcers in a global context in so far as another country's laws may need to be applied if the country in question has legitimate interests to have its laws applicable. 60 A case for using a new mode of global governance can be strengthened by noting that "all institutions contain some policy bias. 61 The greater the policy bias of a national institution, the more biased will be any new form of global governance created by that institution." 62 Moreover, the global nature of the trade nowadays strongly suggests that more of the competition law infringements would cause harm to consumers and businesses in several jurisdictions.
63
There would be specific problems in the "developing countries, which almost by definition do not have the resources to catch and deter violations that originate below their borders." 64 In other words, the inability of some national institutions to adequately enforce their competition laws would leave an enforcement gap which may be seen as another indication that there is a need for "an alternative form of governance" 65 to be considered in the area.
Furthermore, in 2013, the ICN and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a survey among national competition authorities. 66 The survey results reiterated the benefits of the co-operation among national competition authorities, 67 but the overall conclusion appears to be that the "[i]ncentives to co-operation depend on the effectiveness of the international enforcement system. Reforms of the legal and institutional setting for international co-operation can increase incentives for agencies to engage 58 Fox and Arena, supra n 3, 482-3. 59 Guzman, supra n 34, 116. "Continuing and deepening the existing system of bilateral co-operation is important. However, making it work going forward will be increasingly complex, as business becomes more globalised, spanning more jurisdictions enforcing competition law. Governments may want to consider whether new approaches to international co-operation in enforcing competition law are required, in the face of this challenge. These might include, for instance, developing general standards designed to promote both convergence in substance and procedure as well as greater co-operation and co-ordination that could be applied in the context of differing national legal systems around the world." 70 The author's view is that, given the diverse legal traditions and competition law cultures across the globe, the effectiveness of international enforcement system would presuppose an effectively functioning judicial system (or rather effective functioning national judicial systems) which could provide effective remedies in a global context. 71 Indeed, it is difficult to see how the ICN could be used to avoid parallel competition law proceedings, resulting in "choice-of-law rules cannot, without more, address the problems of over-and underregulation.
A choice-of-law system that allows for overlapping jurisdiction leaves the problem of overregulation unresolved. A system that assigns jurisdiction to a single state can reduce the problem of overregulation but may exacerbate the problem of underegulation. Nor can a choiceof-law strategy prevent local favouritism and trade-induced distortions of national substantive policies."
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With this in mind, the author argues that jurisdictional issues would be central in a global context. The issues of jurisdiction and applicable competition laws are best to be addressed through a private international law instrument. This argument will be substantiated by examining some of the cases which have arisen in a global context. "Jurisdiction has always been more than the infrastructure of the judicial order or part of the configuration of legal authority. It is the very extension of the state power in the form of legal authority; it is how legal authority gets done -how it is extended, reconceived and abbreviated.
C. JURISDICTION AND CROSS-BORDER CASES
76 Muir-Watt, "European integration supra n16, 7. See also: Muir-Watt, "Integration and diversity" supra n 16; . 
Jurisdiction to Prescribe
The concept of jurisdiction to prescribe/regulate does suggest which set of competition laws should be used to determine whether there is a competition law infringement. In practice, this may be far from a straightforward process because several states may have legitimate interests for their laws to regulate cross-border business activities. On the one hand, the question as to which set of laws would apply to the merits of a competition law dispute denotes a choice-oflaw problem in so far as such a dispute may essentially be regarded as a commercial dispute.
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On the other hand, national competition authorities, which have the status of public administrative bodies, may be involved in such disputes, so that they may often impose administrative penalties (i.e. fines) on undertakings (e.g. multinational groups of companies)
that have infringed competition laws.
The problems, which arise in this context, can be demonstrated by making reference to Imperial Chemical Industries. 92 In this case, the parties to a dispute before the English court were two English companies. The questions were: Should the English court enforce a contract without taking account of the US antitrust laws? Are the legitimate interests of applying the US laws to be taken account of in this context? The English court performed a private international law analysis when addressing the issues by holding that:
"[this is] an English contract made between English nationals and to be performed in England, to have it performed and, if necessary, to have an order made by the courts of this country for its specific performance. That is a right -it might be said, a species of property, seeing particularly that it is related to patents -which is English in character and is subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts; and it seems to me that the plaintiffs have at least established a prima facie case for saying that it is not competent for the courts of the United States or of any other country to interfere with those rights or to make orders, observance of which by our courts would require that our courts should not exercise the jurisdiction which they have and which it is their duty to exercise in regard to those rights." 
Extra-territoriality and Comity
It is now well established that "there is no room for the notion of territoriality in the conflict of laws which, on the contrary, permits and requires the application of whatever foreign law, statutory or common, public or private, its constituent rules refer to." 94 Collins has noted that "[c]omity may be a discredited concept in the eyes of the textwriters, but it thrives in the judicial decisions" 95 which indicates that the issue should be carefully considered along with the concept of extra-territorial application of competition law provisions.
The extra-territorial application of competition laws has been widely discussed by the courts 96 and commentators. 97 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU may be applied extra-territorially.
This was clearly established by the Court of Justice in Wood Pulp. 98 The extra-territorial application of EU competition laws can be further deduced from the decisions in the Gencor/Lonrho 99 and GE/Honeywell 100 cases. 101 Similarly, the US Sherman Act has been applied to extra-territorial conduct. 102 The extra-territorial application of competition law provisions may be legitimately justified in so far as behaviour of undertakings based in one jurisdiction may often adversely affect the trade (and the process of competition as well as consumers' welfare) in another jurisdiction.
However, competition laws do enjoy public policy character, 104 and as a result they are often regarded as mandatory rules for private international law purposes. 105 The law of the forum may have an important role to play in this context. Extra-territorial application of mandatory rules of the forum may be problematic as different regulations may be applicable to a given legal relationship in different countries. 106 The extra-territorial application of mandatory antitrust law provisions would fly in the face of the "so-called categorical imperative of [private international law which] implies that legal systems of all States are of equal value and deserve the same appreciation." 107 This poses an interesting question about the conflict of mandatory competition laws.
As noted elsewhere, 108 if the applicable set of competition laws does not guarantee that the dispute is sufficiently closely connected with the forum, then an English court, for example, would always need to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as being mandatory rules of the forum. In other words, if an agreement were 'implemented' within the EU and the competition law infringement had appreciable effect on competition or inter-state trade within the EU, then an English court could not refuse to apply EU competition law, even if the competition law infringement was manifestly more closely connected with the US (or the US antitrust law had a stronger claim to be applied). 109 It would have been more appropriate if the policy-makers had provided for a private international law solution in a global context, which would have guaranteed that a set of competition laws would not be applicable unless the dispute is sufficiently closely connected with the forum. 110 The problems might be exacerbated by the adoption of legislative instruments which may limit the application of foreign antitrust laws affecting domestic trading interests. 111 115 In this context, it was stated that the latter measure "prevents B.A. and B.C. complying with any judgment of the district court, in so far as it is given pursuant to the Sherman and Clayton Acts". 116 However, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held the view that the injunction was "purely offensive" 117 in so far as it "seeks to quash the practical power of the United States courts to adjudicate claims under United States law against defendants admittedly subject to the courts' adjudicatory jurisdiction." 118 The US court held that:
"At the root of the conflict are the fundamentally opposed policies of the United States and Great Britain regarding the desirability, scope, and implementation of legislation controlling anticompetitive and restrictive business practices." 119 The difficult issues which relate to the extra-territorial application of competition laws may be further illustrated by making reference to Hartford Fire Insurance. 120 In this case, the US Supreme Court held there was not a true conflict between the US and UK law since the latter did not require the London-based insurers to perform activities which were prohibited by the law of the United States, so that it was still possible for them to comply with the Sherman Act. 121 The foregoing examples strongly suggest that, due to the conflicting public policies at stake, the issue of jurisdiction to adjudicate may be very important in competition law cases in a global context. One should pose the question: Is there a case for linking the assumption of jurisdiction with the applicable substantive competition law/s 122 which are to be applied in global competition law cases?
The importance of allocating jurisdiction to an appropriate court could be demonstrated by making reference to the Vitamin case where "each cartel was global in nature, the object of each was, inter alia, to allocate markets on a worldwide level, and thus to withhold competitive reserves from the EEA market." 123 In follow-on proceedings before the US District Court for the District of Columbia, 124 foreign purchasers 125 of vitamins brought a damages action in connection with vitamins purchased for delivery outside of the United States against members of Vitamin cartels. Although the action was dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 126 the court went on to consider the claimants' argument that the US courts should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign claims with a view to avoiding parallel and related proceedings with respect to the same cartel agreement pending before numerous courts. 127 In this context, Hogan J held that:
"there are comity and efficiency reasons for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the foreign law claims in this case, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' foreign law claims." 128 However, an appeal was made before the Court of Appeals which reversed the first instance court's ruling on the subject matter jurisdiction, and went on to hold that the District Court must consider anew whether to accept supplemental jurisdiction. 129 The case reached the US Supreme Court which adopted a different approach which links the court's jurisdiction with the effects on competition within a country's territory. 130 Therefore, the US court held it has no subject matter jurisdiction in a case where the anti-competitive price-fixing activity was in significant part foreign. In this case, the court went further and held: 'why should American law supplant, for example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determination about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign companies?' 131 The judgment has been interpreted as an indication that the U.S. "Supreme Court is receptive to comity when presented as a tool for statutory construction." 132 However, more importantly for the purposes of this paper, it may be argued that there is a strong case that a regime on jurisdiction may be used as an appropriate PIL mode of governance which allocates jurisdiction in competition law cases in a global context. This would be particularly important because such cross-border competition law infringements will be affecting the process of competition and consumer welfare in a number of jurisdictions. The Vitamins case may indeed be regarded as an example which indicates that the dispute may be allocated to an appropriate court in some cases where the allocation of jurisdiction is linked to the applicable substantive competition law/s.
The deduction that it is vitally important to initiate/consolidate proceeding before an appropriate forum can be further strengthened by the Transportation Surcharge Antitrust Litigation 133 case in which claims of both US and UK victims arising from a global price-fixing conspiracy were settled before the US District Court for the Northern District of California.
D. A CONFLICT OF COMPETITION LAWS: ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
Even more complex jurisdictional issues may arise in cases where there is a conflict of mandatory competition laws. In theory, "[c]hoice-of-law analysis considers which community's legal norms should apply to a dispute involving members of multiple communities". 134 That said, the various national competition law systems may pursue different interests in so far as there could be a difference between promoting national welfare, on the one hand, and enhancing global welfare, on the other hand. 135 If substantive competition law provisions differ, then the outcome of a competition law dispute would depend on where the proceedings are initiated. For example, in Wood Pulp, the US Webb-Pomerene Act did exempt the export cartel agreements from the prohibitions laid down in the US antitrust laws. 136 As a result, it was essential for the Commission to establish that EU competition laws applied and regulated the private undertakings' behaviour. Similarly, it was crucial for the litigants in Laker The point could be further illustrated by making reference to two sets of competition law proceedings, involving Virgin Airways (Virgin) and British Airways (BA) in the US 139 and the EU. 140 In July 1993, Virgin lodged a complaint with the European Commission, directed in particular against the marketing agreements which enabled certain agents to receive payments in addition to the basic commission. 141 Another complaint was filed by Virgin in the Southern District of New York. 142 In the first set of proceedings, the Commission decided to take the complaint up, and initiate proceedings. In July 1999, the Commission rendered a decision finding an infringement of EU competition law. 143 However, a different view was held by the courts in the US. In October 1999, the District Court granted a summary judgment to British
Airways on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence that BA engaged in anticompetitive practices. 144 The Virgin/BA competition law disputes not only show that there may be irreconcilable views with regard to the same type of business activities, but also that the proceedings may be time consuming and costly due to the level of uncertainty in a global context.
Therefore, there is a strong case that establishing jurisdiction in one country rather than another may be very important in cases where there is a conflict of competition laws. The issues are indeed important because, as already noted, there may often be a conflict of competition laws in a global context in so far as the regional/national competition law policy objectives may vary 145 and competition law rules themselves may differ. 146 Elhauge and Geradin 147 have recently made the following observation:
"Although […] U.S. and EU doctrine [i.e. sets of competition law rules] are closer than they might appear and probably converging over time, there remain important differences. Those differences include divergent rules on: (1) excessive unilateral pricing; (2) above-cost predatory pricing; (3) a recoupment requirement for below-cost predatory pricing; (4) 155 In other words, there may not be overregulation, but on the contrary there may be a strong case that there is an enforcement gap at present. 156 remedies which should be deployed. 159 In this case, Microsoft was found to infringe Article 102
TFEU by refusing to supply the complete and accurate specifications to some of its competitors as well as by making the availability of the Microsoft Windows operating system on the simultaneous acquisition of Windows Media Player. 160 However, the European Union approach and the remedies imposed were criticised by the US authorities 161 and commentators. 162 Similarly, the EU policy makers have expressed a disapproving attitude towards some of the remedies deployed by the US legislator. For example, it is well established that a US award of multiple damages would infringe the UK Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, which may therefore affect the availability of such damages in England. 163 As noted elsewhere, 164 the prevailing opinion 165 is that an English court should refuse to multiply the sum assessed as compensation on the ground that multiple damages would be contrary to its public policy. But why should an English court not consider the legitimate interests of a foreign competition law system awarding treble damages, if the relevant anti-competitive conduct is significantly foreign? 166 There are good reasons suggesting that a new mode of governance, incorporating a private international law solution, which provides for co-ordination of the various competition law systems, would be needed. Such a global instrument could allow a court to factor in the fact that a foreign competition law system, which has legitimate interests in regulating the business activities in question, had decided that multiple damages are an appropriate and effective remedy for breach of its competition laws. In particular, if the US legislature had decided that the probability of detection of an illegal cartel is 33 per cent and as a result any compensatory award should be tripled to provide an effective remedy for certain competition law infringements, 167 then this very remedy should be awarded in an appropriate case, for example, by an English court. 168 In other words, such a new global PIL mechanism would take account of fact that the foreign competition law system has legitimate interest to decide how best to enforce its own antitrust laws in a case, in which the anti-competitive conduct took place in its territory, causing anti-competitive harm there. 169 
Conditions for bringing competition law actions: a level of divergence
The case for a global regime may be strengthened if one considers the level of divergence between conditions for bringing competition law actions. A recent study 173 shows the conditions for bringing antitrust claims do influence litigants' tactics even in Europe where EU competition law forms part of each Member State's legal order. A case for harmonisation was made by a recently adopted Directive on antitrust damages actions. 174 the defendant in an action for damages can invoke as a defence against a claim for damages the fact that the claimant passed on the whole or part of the overcharge resulting from the infringement of competition law." 176 As a matter of EU law, anyone who has suffered harm caused by a competition law infringement has the right to be "able to claim and obtain full compensation for that harm." 177 Thus, an indirect purchaser 178 may seek compensation for losses suffered from the anti-competitive conduct 179 or to enjoin future anti-competitive conduct. 180 On the contrary, the passing-on defence cannot be invoked by defendants in the US. 181 Moreover, the US Supreme Court in Illinois Brick v Illinois 182 held that:
following an automatic recovery of the full overcharge by the direct purchaser, the indirect purchaser could sue to recover the same amount. The risk of duplicative recoveries created by unequal application of the Hanover Shoe rule is much more substantial than in the more usual situation where the defendant is sued in two different lawsuits by plaintiffs asserting conflicting claims to the same fund. A one-sided application of Hanover Shoe substantially increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications --and therefore of unwarranted multiple liability for the defendant --by presuming that one plaintiff (the direct purchaser) is entitled to full recovery while preventing the defendant from using that presumption against the other plaintiff; overlapping recoveries are certain to result from the two lawsuits unless the indirect purchaser is unable to establish any pass-on whatsoever. Recently the Canadian Supreme Court had a chance to opine on this, and went on to hold that the rejection of the passing on defence does not preclude the indirect purchasers' actions.
184
This example clearly suggests that, despite the similarities/distinctions between the various competition law systems, the questions of double and multiple recoveries may well be addressed in a global context through a private international law tool used as a new mode of governance.
Collective redress mechanisms may be seen as yet another area which suggests that, despite the remaining differences, the trend is for the regimes to become more similar than they used to be in the past. It should be noted that class actions on an opt-out basis 185 
E. THE WAY FORWARD: A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW TOOL AS A NEW MODE OF
GOVERNANCE
The foregoing examples suggest that there is a strong case for the issues of competence allocation and applicable competition laws (which may apply with respect to the same crossborder business activities performed in a global context) to be addressed head-on by policymakers in a global context. A private international law mechanism may be particularly important to this end. that "adjudicatory action of one jurisdiction, if it is to be fully effective, will often require the cooperation of other jurisdictions." 196 The rules designed to deal with the parallel proceedings would be particularly important in this context. The European Union regime is based on the assumption that the court first seised is always more appropriate. 197 However, it may often be the case that the court first seised is not well placed to hear and determine a competition law dispute because, for example, an anti-competitive agreement, which has been implemented in a number of countries, does not affect the market in the jurisdiction where the action is brought. decline jurisdiction (or transfer the proceedings 199 ) in cases where agreement or practice has no substantial direct (actual or foreseeable) effects on competition within the jurisdiction. 200 The advantages of an approach which links the court's jurisdiction with the effects on competition within a country's territory as well as with the applicable competition laws could be demonstrated by the US Supreme Court ruling in the Empagran case. 201 Another important issue, which is to be considered when devising a global competition law regime based on co-operation between the various competition law systems relates to the question "whether and how choice-of-law practices should be taken into account in the formulation of rules governing the assumption of adjudicatory jurisdiction." 202 Given the public policy character of most competition law provisions (and their mandatory nature in particular), the traditional private international theories which presuppose "the selection of a single governing law for resolution of multistate disputes" 203 may not produce satisfactory results in cases where there are competition law infringements which are often global in nature. In such cases, the problems may be dealt with by "recourse to special substantive rules which would seek to adjust, on a basis of equality, the views of all legitimately concerned jurisdictions." On the other hand, the prevailing view appears to be that it would be very difficult (if not impossible) to agree (directly or indirectly) at The Hague Conference on a global rule on jurisdiction for competition law cases. Due to political dimension of jurisdiction, 217 the States around the globe may be very careful when negotiating jurisdictional rules which are to allocate jurisdiction in antitrust cases. In view of that, one may argue that a "multilevel 'judicial governance'" 218 of competition law enforcement activities in a global context may be best discussed and achieved under the auspices of the OECD which is well aware of the "complexity of cross-border competition law enforcement co-operation". 219 The OECD may take a lead in proposing and negotiating a multi-lateral agreement which may be used as a new form of cooperation with a view to co-ordinating cross-border antitrust enforcement activities in a global context. To this end, a private international law tool may be used to allocate jurisdiction in competition law cases as well as to promote the recognition and enforcement of judgments, whilst encouraging a closer co-operation of the competition authorities in the ICN framework. 220 
